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MITIGATION FOR UNIVERSITY 
HEALTH SYSTEMS AND TRANSFER 
TRAUMA: 
HURRICANE SANDY AS CASE STUDY 
 
Dana M. Greene, Ph.D. 
Research Fellow  
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
Issues Relating to Transfer 
Trauma 
 Since Hurricane Katrina, disaster 
preparedness and disaster response have 
received increased since Hurricane Katrina 
 Academic Medical Centers have been both 
victims and important resources for disaster 
response and mitigation. 

Hurricane Sandy was the largest Atlantic hurricane on 
record, as well as the second costliest Atlantic 
hurricane, only surpassed by Hurricane Katrina in 
2005. Hurricane Sandy devastated portions of the 
Caribbean, Mid-Atlantic and North-Eastern United 
States in late October 2012.
 
Sandy is estimated in 
early calculations to have caused damage of at least 
$20 billion (2012 USD).
 
 

Hospital Evacuations  
New York University Health 
System 
 NYU didn’t anticipate such heavy flooding 
from Sandy and chose not to evacuate  all its 
patients before the storm, as they did with 
Hurricane Irene a year ago.  
 But between 7 and 7:45 p.m. Monday, the 
hospital’s basement, lower floors, and 
elevator shafts filled with 10 to 12 feet of 
water, and the hospital lost its power 
. 
“The flooding was just 
unprecedented.” 
 Emergency generators did kick in, but two 
hours later, about 90% of that power went 
out, and the hospital decided to evacuate. 
[...] Four of the newborns were on respirators 
that were breathing for them, and when the 
power went out, each baby was carried 
down nine flights of stairs while a nurse 
manually squeezed a bag to deliver air to 
the baby’s lungs. 
 
The Evacuation Process 
 About 1,000 staff members — including 
doctors, nurses, residents, and medical 
students — worked to evacuate the 
remaining patients by flashlight, along with 
the help of firefighters and police officers  
NYU Medical Center Under 
Water 
 NYU’s facility is designed to withstand floods, 
and only one building flooded during 
Hurricane Irene.  
 Sandy left seven hospital buildings flooded 
with between seven and ten feet of water. 
 
 
Disaster Medicine? 
 Includes: 
 Planning 
 Surveillance 
 Response 
Hospital Preparation  
Hospitals with a regular risk of “predicted” 
disasters prepare differently than hospitals 
facing “unpredicted” disasters.  
 
With respect to “predicted” disasters, plans 
should address not just staff coverage, but 
also coverage for patients who can or can’t be 
evacuated easily 
 Transfer trauma associated with transfer vs. possible 
diminished capacity to treat after the storm hits;  
  
  Need to assess the likelihood of catastrophic failures in 
ability to care for  patients.  
  
  Need to assess the expected medical costs associated 
with transfer/transportation out of risk zone against 
possible risk of keeping patient  in risk zone in the event 
of catastrophic failures. 
 
  Financial costs of transfer should not be controlling factor; 
and  
  
 Consideration of location of facility, back-up systems, risk of 
breaches to integrity  of structure, etc.  
   
 
Review Weakest Links for 
Failure 
Concerns of potential flooding may have led to relocation of back-up power  
generators above area of potential flooding;   
 
  if portion of wiring remains below area of potential flooding, that is the weakest link that will fail; 
and  
 
Consider difficulties of evacuating critically ill patients down several flights of  stairs if a catastrophic 
power failure and back up generator failure:  
 
 No elevator service;  
 
  Loss of Ventilator capabilities;  
 
 Need to manually ventilate patients while team carries patients down stairs; 
     and  
 
 Considerations of logistical difficulties may impact decision on where to house most critical 
patients 
Evacuation Issues 
 What should be order of evacuation?  
   
 i) Most critically ill first?  
   
 (1) Issue of whether some of most critically ill would be able 
to survive evacuations.  
   
 ii) Infants and new mothers first?  
   
 iii) Strategy for evacuating patients with poor survival 
prognosis?  
   
 
Issues with Evacuating High 
Technology 
 Dialysis patients 
Ventilator patients; 
 
(1) Manual ventilation  
  
(2) Evacuation of patients with personnel to provide manual 
ventilation  
  
 (a) Potential loss of staff coverage when needed staff evacuate 
with  patients.  
 
  (3) Carrying patients down stairs and onto evacuation vehicle all 
while  
  manually ventilating patient.  
 
 
Recommendations 
 
 Use community capacity-building strategies 
 
 Involve diverse stakeholders 
 
 Address different levels of preparedness 
 
 Initiate locally  
 
 Coordinate collaboration 
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